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VIRGINIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE*
Ronald J. Bacigal**
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Search and Seizure
Reversing a recent trend, the past year was relatively quiet with
respect to search and seizure cases. The United States Supreme
Court decided two cases dealing with open fields and the curtilage
of a dwelling. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States' held that the
open areas of an industrial plant complex with numerous plant
structures spread over an area of 2,000 acres are not analogous to
the "curtilage" of a dwelling for purposes of aerial surveillance;
such an industrial complex "is more comparable to an open field
and as such is open to the view and observation of persons in air-
craft lawfully in the public airspace immediately above or suffi-
ciently near the area for the reach of cameras."2 In California v.
Ciraolo,s the Court explained that even areas within the curtilage
are not protected from all police observation. While erecting ten-
foot fences around the defendant's backyard may have shielded
the yard from ground surveillance, the fences did not protect the
yard from aerial observation.4
The previous term, in Winston v. Lee,5 the United States Su-
preme Court recognized that certain intrusions upon privacy (sur-
gery to remove a bullet) are so serious that they require a higher
level of probable cause. This term, New York v. P.J. Video, Inc.'
held that the seizure of materials presumptively protected by the
* This article addresses significant legislative changes, decisions of the United States and
Virginia Supreme Courts, and decisions of the Virginia Court of Appeals. A more extensive
consideration of this material as well as recent decisions of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit and federal district courts is contained in R. BACIGAL, VIRGINIA CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (Supp. 1986).
** Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.S., 1964,
Concord College; LL.B., 1967, Washington & Lee University.
1. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
2. Id. at 1827.
3. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
4. Id. at 1813.
5. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
6. 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986).
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first amendment does not require a higher standard. The Court
went on to state that probable cause requires only "a fair
probability" or "substantial chance" of criminal activity, not an ac-
tual showing of such activity.7
With respect to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, the
Virginia Court of Appeals held that a casual visitor lacks standing
to contest the search of a residence." The visitor failed to show "a
possessory interest in the place searched, a right to exclude others
from the premises, the right to use the premises in the absence of
the rightful tenants, the possession of a key or the presence of
clothes, or any other property inside the apartment searched." 9 In
Kimmelman v. Morrison,0 the United States Supreme Court dis-
cussed the overlap of fourth and sixth amendment claims raised in
a federal writ of habeas corpus. Stone v. Powell" bars federal
habeas corpus review of a fourth amendment claim if the state has
provided an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of that claim.
However, Stone does not bar sixth amendment ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims, even when such claims are founded pri-
marily on incompetent representation with respect to fourth
amendment issues. 2 Thus, counsel's incompetence in failing to file
a supression motion could be litigated in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding."
The 1986 Virginia General Assembly enacted provisions relating
to the search of an attorney's office.' 4 Search warrants for evidence
of any crime solely involving a client of the attorney must be is-
sued by a circuit court judge. Any evidence seized must be sealed
by the issuing judge, who shall conduct an in-camera inspection of
the evidence in the presence of the attorney from whom the evi-
dence was seized. The judge shall return any evidence determined
to be within the scope of the attorney-client privilege and not oth-
erwise subject to seizure. The General Assembly also provided for
forfeiture of property used in connection with sexually explicit vis-
ual material, which material contains a person less than eighteen
7. Id. at 1616.
8. McCoy v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 309, 343 S.E.2d 383 (1986).
9. Id. at 312, 343 S.E.2d at 385.
10. 106 S. Ct. 2574 (1986).
11. 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976).
12. Kimmelman, 106 S. Ct. at 2582.
13. Id. at 2574.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-56.1 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
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years of age as a subject.'5
Finally, in the area of search and seizure, the Virginia Supreme
Court chilled attempts to give an expansive reading to the Virginia
constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches. Although most
of the provisions of the Virginia Bill of Rights16 closely parallel the
Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution, Virginia courts
have authority to interpret the state constitution to confer greater
rights than those minimum rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. 17 Some credence was given to this approach in Mo-
sher Steel-Virginia v. Teig,18 where the court went beyond United
States Supreme Court precedent and noted that a general inspec-
tion warrant "comes uncomfortably close" to violating article I,
section 10 of the Virginia Constitution. 19 However, in Lowe v.
Commonwealth,20 the court noted that "the Virginia requirements,
under our constitution and the statutes implementing the constitu-
tional provision, are 'substantially the same as those contained in
the Fourth Amendment.' ,,21
B. Arrest, Stop and Frisk
Horne v. Commonwealth22 recognized that failure to take a sus-
pect before a magistrate without unnecessary delay violates statu-
tory procedures, 3 but does not render the arrest unconstitutional.
Only when the delay results in the loss of exculpatory evidence has
the court recognized a violation of the defendant's due process
rights.24 In Verez v. Commonwealth,25 the court held that, even
when the police have an adequate opportunity to obtain an arrest
warrant in advance, they are not required to do so if an emergency
15. Id. § 18.2-374.2.
16. VA. CONST. art. I.
17. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv.
L. REv. 489 (1977).
18. 229 Va. 95, 327 S.E.2d 87 (1985).
19. Id. at 102, 327 S.E.2d at 92.
20. 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986).
21. Id. at 348 n.1, 337 S.E.2d at 274-75 n.1 (quoting 1 A. HowARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 182 (1974)).
22. 230 Va. 512, 339 S.E.2d 186 (1986); see also Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. -, 345
S.E.2d 267 (1986).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-76 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
24. Winston v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 386, 49 S.E.2d 611 (1948). In Horne, the court
refused to examine the officer's subjective motivation for the delay. Home, 230 Va. at 517,
339 S.E.2d at 189.
25. 230 Va. 405, 337 S.E.2d 749 (1985).
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exists at the time of a warrantless entry of a dwelling. The opinion
contains a helpful list of ten forms of exigent circumstances which
justify a warrantless entry of a dwelling:
(1) the degree of urgency involved and the time required to get a
warrant; (2) the officers' reasonable belief that contraband is about
to be removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to others,
including police officers left to guard the site; (4) information that
the possessors of the contraband are aware that the police may be
on their trail; (5) whether the offense is serious, or involves violence;
(6) whether officers reasonably believe the suspects are armed; (7)
whether there is, at the time of entry, a clear showing of probable
cause; (8) whether the officers have strong reason to believe the sus-
pects are actually present in the premises; (9) the likelihood of es-
cape if the suspects are not swiftly apprehended; and (10) the sus-
pects' recent entry into the premises after hot pursuit."
The neglected area of extradition received further clarification in
two recent cases. The Virginia Court of Appeals held that habeas
corpus is not a proper proceeding in which to try the question of
alibi, or any other question as to guilt or innocence. "Only when it
is conclusively proved that no question can be made, that the per-
son was not within the demanding state when the crime is said to
have been committed . . . is he to be released. ' s7 Traditionally, a
habeas corpus proceeding is limited to an examination of: "(a)
whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b)
whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the de-
manding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in
the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fu-
gitive. '2 However, in Plaster v. United States,29 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit recognized that extradition may also
be resisted on grounds that the government previously agreed not
to extradite the defendant in return for his agreement to testify
against others.
In the area of stop and frisk, the Virginia Supreme Court made
26. Id. at 410-11, 337 S.E.2d at 753.
27. Manning v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 60, 62, 334 S.E.2d 151, 153 (1985).
28. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978). Manning v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App.
60, 61, 334 S.E.2d 151, 152 (1985), defined a fugitive as one who leaves the demanding state
after having incurred guilt there.
29. 789 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1986).
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its first ruling upon the question of roadblocks.3 0 The court recog-
nized that Delaware v. Prouse31 prohibited law enforcement per-
sonnel from stopping motorists in a "wholly random and discre-
tionary manner. ' '1 2  Prouse was distinguished, however, in
situations where fixed roadblocks are operated "pursuant to a
practice embodying neutral criteria. ' 33 The court noted that "[t]he
officers at the checkpoint had no discretion regarding which vehi-
cles to stop: every southbound vehicle was halted. '34 When an au-
tomobile is lawfully stopped, the motorist has no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)
generally visible from outside the automobile. 5 A limited intrusion
into the vehicle to view the VIN is constitutionally permissible
and, once inside the vehicle, the officer may seize objects found in
plain view.3 6
In Jones v. Commonwealth,37 the Virginia Supreme Court dis-
tinguished Kolendar v. Lawson, 3  another leading United States
Supreme Court case in the stop and frisk area. Kolendar had
demonstrated the United States Supreme Court's willingness to
strike down a "stop and identify" statute as unconstitutionally
vague under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Jones, however, the defendant was stopped on reasonable suspi-
cion that criminal activity was afoot, and the defendant then re-
fused to identify himself, as required by an Arlington County ordi-
nance. The police officer detained the defendant and "patted
down" both his person and his duffel bag. The Virginia Supreme
Court stated that "[n]othing in Terry or its progeny indicates that
the authority of a police officer to make 'reasonable inquiries,' to
'determine [a suspect's] identity,' and to obtain 'more information'
from or about a suspect depends in any way upon whether a pat-
down reveals weapons or evidence of a crime. '39 In addition to the
pat-down, the police may make reasonable inquiries to determine
30. Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E:2d 273 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1464 (1986).
31. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
32. Lowe, 230 Va. at 349, 337 S.E.2d at 275.
33. Id. at 350, 337 S.E.2d at 276.
34. Id. at 352, 337 S.E.2d at 277.
35. New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
36. Id. at 962. In Class, the officer saw the handle of a gun protruding from underneath
the driver's seat and seized the gun.
37. 230 Va. 14, 334 S.E.2d 536 (1985).
38. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
39. Jones, 230 Va. at 19, 334 S.E.2d at 540.
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identity, and may maintain the status quo momentarily while ob-
taining more information.
II. FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS
A. Confessions
In Moran v. Burbine,4 ° the defendant's sister telephoned the
public defender's office to obtain legal assistance for the defendant.
The public defender then phoned the police department and
stated that she would act as defendant's legal counsel for any
lineup or interrogation. She was informed that the police were
"through with" the defendant for the night, and he would not be
questioned. Less than an hour later the police interrogated the de-
fendant after obtaining a waiver of his Miranda rights. The United
States Supreme Court held that a voluntary waiver is not vitiated
either by the failure of the police to inform the defendant that an
attorney retained by a third party is attempting to reach him, or
by misleading information furnished to the attorney by the police.
"[W]hether intentional or inadvertent, the state of mind of the po-
lice is irrelevant to the question of the intelligence and voluntari-
ness of respondent's election to abandon his rights. Although
highly inappropriate, even deliberate deception of an attorney
could not possibly affect a suspect's decision to waive his Miranda
rights unless he were at least aware of the incident."'"
Once the accused asserts his right to counsel "at an arraignment
or similar proceeding, '42 any subsequent waiver of the defendant's
right to counsel for a police-initiated interrogation is invalid.43
When the right to counsel has been exercised, the police may not
interfere with the efforts of a defendant's attorney to act as a "me-
dium" between the state and the accused. Maine v. Moulton44 rec-
ognized that "knowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity
to confront the accused without counsel being present ' 45 is a viola-
tion of the sixth amendment. In Moulton, the police used an in-
40. 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
41. Id. at 1142.
42. The right to counsel attaches at the commencement of adversary judicial proceedings
and the court has "never held that the right to counsel attaches at the time of arrest."
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 190 (1984).
43. Michigan v. Jackson, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 1411 (1986).
44. 106 S. Ct. 477 (1985). Moulton was applied in Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. -,
345 S.E.2d 267 (1986).
45. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. at 487.
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former to confront an indicted defendant as part of an investiga-
tion of a new and different offense. The incriminating statements
relating to the new offense were held admissable, but the state-
ments relating to the pending charges were deemed inadmissible."
The holding in Moulton appears to overturn the Virginia Supreme
Court's decision in Hummel v. Commonwealth.47 Moulton itself
was distinguished in Kuhlmann v. Wilson,48 where the Court
stated that its "primary concern" was secret interrogation by in-
vestigative techniques that are "the equivalent of direct police in-
terrogation. '49 The sixth amendment does not forbid admission of
a defendant's statements to a jailhouse informant who was "placed
in close proximity but made no effort to stimulate conversations
about the crime charged. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate
that the police and their informant took some action, beyond
merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incrimi-
nating remarks."5
Although Miranda considerations dominate present cases, the
courts offered reminders that confessions must also be assessed in
terms of voluntariness, credibility, and with regard to corroborat-
ing evidence. Miller v. Fenton51 held that the issue of voluntariness
is a legal question (not a wholly factual question) requiring inde-
pendent judicial determination upon a federal writ of habeas
corpus. Although the "voluntariness" of the confession is a legal
question for the trial judge, the defendant also has the right to
challenge the confession's "reliability" before the jury.52 Caminade
v. Commonwealth53 recognized that if the defendant's statement
falls short of an admission to all essential elements of a crime,
there must be independent evidence of the corpus delicti. If
neither the admission nor the independent evidence fully establish
the corpus delicti, a conviction cannot be based upon the defend-
ant's admission.
In Wainwright v. Greenfield," the United States Supreme Court
held that post-Miranda silence cannot be used to establish the de-
46. Id. at 489-90.
47. 219 Va. 252, 247 S.E.2d 385 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979).
48. 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986).
49. Id. at 2630.
50. Id.
51. 106 S. Ct. 445 (1985).
52. Crane v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 2142 (1986).
53. 230 Va. 505, 338 S.E.2d 846 (1986).
54. 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986).
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fendant's sanity. In Pierce v. Commonwealth,5 part of an oral con-
fession related to the offense charged, while part of the confession
related to defendant's status as a parolee. The Virginia Court of
Appeals held that "when the part bearing on the issue can be sepa-
rated from the parts relating to other offenses, only that part rele-
vant and material to the issue is admissible."56
In Cunningham v. Commonwealth,57 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals discussed an in-court assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination, and the form of immunity granted under Virginia
Code section 19.2-270. While the holding of the court breaks no
new ground, the lengthy majority and concurring opinions are a
helpful summary of the law in this area. The United States Su-
preme Court also offered further interpretation of the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. Allen v. Illinois58 held
that the privilege does not apply merely because the defendant is
threatened with some deprivation of his liberty. Although the de-
fendant was confined for treatment as a "sexually dangerous per-
son," his compelled statements could not be used in future crimi-
nal proceedings, and his confinement was civil, not criminal, in
nature. Thus, the privilege could not be asserted in the civil pro-
ceeding to determine his status as a sexually dangerous person.5 9
B. Right to Counsel
The Virginia Supreme Court strictly construed the requirement
that an indigent's voluntary waiver of counsel must appear on the
record. In Church v. Commonwealth,6" the court held that reversal
is mandated even when there is a "fortuitous omission" of that
part of the record which might have established voluntary waiver.
Church also reiterated that "a defendant who represents himself is
no less bound by the rules of procedure and substantive law than a
defendant represented by counsel." 6'
In Abney v. Warden, Mecklenberg Correctional Center,62 the
Virginia Court of Appeals expounded on the United States Su-
55. 2 Va. App. 383, 345 S.E.2d 1 (1986).
56. Id. at 391, 345 S.E.2d at 5.
57. 2 Va. App. 358, 344 S.E.2d 389 (1986).
58. 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986).
59. Id. at 2995.
60. 230 Va. 208, 335 S.E.2d 823 (1985).
61. Id. at 213, 335 S.E.2d at 826.
62. 1 Va. App. 26, 332 S.E.2d 802 (1985).
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preme Court's recent approach to claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.6 3 First, the defendant has the burden to show that coun-
sel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the sixth amendment. Sec-
ond, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.6 4 This requires showing that counsel's er-
rors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable. 5 If a defendant alleges that his guilty
plea was caused by inadequate representation of counsel, "the de-
fendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial."66
In the context of the sixth amendment right to counsel, the
United States Supreme Court offered guidance in handling the
troublesome problem of a client who intends to commit perjury.
Nix v. Whiteside67 held that defense counsel's threat to withdraw
from defendant's representation, and to disclose the defendant's
perjury, does not constitute attorney error. Nor is prejudice estab-
lished when defense counsel's action causes the defendant to pro-
vide truthful rather than perjured testimony.
The 1986 General Assembly increased the compensation paid to
court-appointed counsel. 8 In district court, maximum compensa-
tion was raised to $86. In circuit court, the maximum was raised to
$460 for offenses punishable by confinement for more than twenty
years; $230 for other felony charges; and $115 in misdemeanor
cases.
IIL MISCELLANEOUS
A. Indictments
On an indictment for larceny, the defendant may demand that
the Commonwealth's Attorney designate the particular form of lar-
ceny that he intends to prove, i.e., larceny, embezzlement, false
63. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 106
S. Ct. 2574 (1986).
64. Abney, 1 Va. App. at 29, 332 S.E.2d at 804.
65. Hill v. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985).
66. Id. at 372.
67. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (Cum. Supp. 1986); see also id. § 16.1-267.
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pretenses, or receiving stolen property. A written designation shall
be furnished to the defense no later than five days prior to trial
provided the demand was made more than five days prior to such
date.6 9 If the defendant does not make timely demand, the Com-
monwealth's Attorney may orally designate, in open court, the par-
ticular larceny statute upon which he relies.70 It is not fatal vari-
ance to erroneously state the ownership of property taken in a
robbery. Robbery is a crime against the person and, so long as the
property taken was in the care and custody of the victim, ultimate
ownership is irrelevant. A mistaken allegation of ownership could
not have caused the defendant harm in terms of a fair and impar-
tial trial on the merits.7 1
In Abney v. Warden, Mecklenberg Correctional Center,72 the
Virginia Court of Appeals held that "as long as the indictments
were not so defective as to deprive the court of jurisdiction to
render judgments of conviction, a petitioner may not collaterally
attack the sufficiency of the indictments by a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. 7 3
B. Discovery
The discovery provisions of Rule 3A:11 of the Rules of Virginia
Supreme Court apply only to those records within the possession,
custody, or control of the commonwealth.74 Stating that "[t]he
Commonwealth cannot disclose what it does not have," the court
in Robinson v. Commonwealth3 found no discovery violation when
an expert witness changed her conclusions on the morning she was
to testify, and the commonwealth revealed this change prior to her
testimony.76 When a discovery violation does occur, the undis-
closed evidence may be admitted if it does not prejudice the sub-
stantial rights of the defendant.
The defendant's constitutional right to discovery of exculpatory
evidence was clarified by federal and Virginia cases. The courts
69. Id. § 18.2-111 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
70. Roberts v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 264, 337 S.E.2d 255 (1985).
71. Hairston v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 211, 343 S.E.2d 355 (1986).
72. 1 Va. App. 26, 332 S.E.2d 802 (1985).
73. Id. at 29, 332 S.E.2d at 804.
74. Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 337 S.E.2d 729 (1985).
75. 231 Va. 142, 341 S.E.2d 159 (1986).
76. Id. at 155, 341 S.E.2d at 167.
77. Davis v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 201, 335 S.E.2d 375 (1985).
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had previously recognized three separate standards which applied
to the discovery of exculpatory evidence.7 8 In United States v.
Bagley, 9 Justice Blackmun formulated a single standard: whether
failure to disclose creates a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability was defined as "a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."80
It was unclear whether this new standard was constitutionally
binding upon state courts,' but the Virginia Supreme Court fol-
lowed Bagley in deciding Robinson v. Commonwealth.2 Robinson
also noted that impeachment value alone may render the informa-
tion exculpatory.8 3
C. Double Jeopardy
In Smalis v. Pennsylvania,84 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the trial court's dismissal of a criminal charge based on a
defense demurrer to the prosecution's case did not constitute an
acquittal. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
"a judgment that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain a
guilty verdict constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause."85 Presumably, a motion to strike in Virginia
would be treated as was the Pennsylvania demurrer to the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief.
The United States Supreme Court also held that the separate
sovereigns doctrine8 6 applies to two states. Thus "successive prose-
cutions by two states for the same conduct are not barred by the
double jeopardy clause. 81 7 The Court also made a refinement in
the double jeopardy principles applicable to lesser included of-
fenses. The general rule is that a conviction of a lesser included
offense at the first trial constitutes an implied acquittal of the
greater offense, thus the denfedant cannot be retried on the
78. See Dozier v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1113, 253 S.E.2d 655 (1979).
79. 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985).
80. Id. at 3384.
81. Two Justices fully endorsed the standard, but three concurring Justices expressed
qualified approval.
82. Robinson, 231 Va. 142, 341 S.E.2d 159.
83. Id. at 150, 341 S.E.2d at 165.
84. 106 S. Ct. 1745 (1986).
85. Id. at 1747.
86. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
87. Heath v. Alabama, 106 S. Ct. 433, 437 (1985).
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greater offense. 8 However, "when a jeopardy-barred conviction is
reduced to a conviction for a lesser included offense which is not
jeopardy-barred, the burden shifts to defendant to demonstrate a
reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of
the nonjeopardy-barred offense absent the presence of the jeop-
ardy-barred offense." '
The Virginia Court of Appeals interpreted Wharton's Rule9" as
barring a conspiracy conviction only when the commission of the
substantive offense requires the participation of two people.91 Such
a holding will have limited significance in light of the recent statu-
tory change which bars a conspiracy conviction when the defend-
ant has been convicted of the substantive offense.2
D. Jury Trials
Central to the right to a fair trial before a jury is the principle
that the defendant's guilt or innocence not be affected by the con-
ditions of his pretrial custody. Thus, it is unconstitutional to force
the defendant to wear prison clothes before the jury because no
"essential state policy" is served by compelling a defendant to
dress in this manner.9 ' However, legitimate government interests
in security may justify certain restraints which do not unduly
prejudice the jury. Perhaps because of the recent increase in ter-
rorist activity, Holbrook v. Flynn9 4 approved the use of additional
security guards in the courtroom to maintain custody over defend-
ants who have been denied bail. Frye v. Commonwealth,5 recog-
nized that chains and handcuffs may be used in extraordinary
cases where the defendant has a propensity for violent crime and
escape. However, in an effort to diminish prejudice to the defend-
ant, the Virginia Court of Appeals placed restrictions upon the in-
troduction of "mug shots" of the defendant.96 Such photographs
are admissible if three conditions are met: (1) the prosecution
88. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-285 (Repl. Vol.
1983).
89. Morris v. Mathews, 106 S. Ct. 1032 (1986).
90. The classic Wharton's Rule offenses are adultery, incest, bigamy, and dueling, which
necessarily involve at least two people.
91. Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 265, 343 S.E.2d 465 (1986).
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-23.1 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
93. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976).
94. 106 S. Ct. 1340 (1986).
95. 231 Va. -, 345 S.E.2d 267 (1986).
96. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 447, 345 S.E.2d 303 (1986).
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demonstrates a need to introduce the photographs; (2) the photo-
graphs, if shown to the jury, must not imply that the defendant
has a prior criminal record; and (3) the manner of introduction at
trial must be such that it does not draw particular attention to the
source or implications of the photographs.9 7
The Virginia Supreme Court had previously recognized two situ-
ations which called for automatic disqualification of a juror: (1) ve-
niremen related within the ninth degree of consanguinity or affin-
ity to a party to the trial;98 and (2) a juror with ownership of stock
in a victim corporation.9 Baker v. Commonwealth"° added a third
ground: a juror's knowledge of the accused's previous conviction of
the same offense for which he is being retried. In these three situa-
tions, "automatic exclusions leave no room for judicial discre-
tion." 101 Wilson v. Commonwealth"0 2 also recognized that it was re-
versible error for the trial judge to inform the jury that defense
counsel had challenged the jury for cause and had made a motion
to strike the entire jury panel.
In Turner v. Murray,0 the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced separate rules for dealing with racial issues in capital and
non-capital offenses. In non-capital offenses, the fact of interracial
violence alone is not a "special circumstance"'104 entitling the de-
fendant to have prospective jurors questioned about racial
prejudice. However, "a capital defendant accused of an interracial
crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of
the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias."'10 5
The Court also announced new rules with respect to peremptory
challenges based upon race. Batson v. Kentucky'06 held that a de-
fendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimina-
97. Id. at 454, 345 S.E.2d at 307.
98. Gray v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 591, 311 S.E.24 409 (1984).
99. Salina v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 92, 225 S.E.2d 199 (1976). Salina was distinguished
in Scott v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 447, 339 S.E.2d 889 (1986), where the Virginia Court
of Appeals refused to adopt a per se rule disqualifying jurors employed by the victim of a
crime.
100. 230 Va. 370, 337 S.E.2d 729 (1985).
101. Id. at 375, 337 S.E.2d at 733.
102. 2 Va. App. 134, 342 S.E.2d 65 (1986).
103. 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986).
104. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
105. Turner, 106 S. Ct. at 1688.
106. 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). Batson will not be applied retroactively on collateral review
of convictions that became final before Batson was decided. Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878,
2880 (1986) (per curiam).
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tion in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's
trial. To establish such a case of discrimination, the defendant
must show that: (1) he is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2)
the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove
members of the defendant's race; and (3) facts and other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that
practice to exclude veniremen from the petit jury on account of
their race. °10 Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the
burden shifts to the state to come forward with a neutral explana-
tion for challenging black jurors. The prosecutor may not rebut the
defendant's case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory
motive or by affirming his good faith in individual selections. The
prosecutor must articulate a neutral explanation related to the
particular case to be tried.
Both the United States Supreme Court, in Lockhart v. Mc-
Cree,1°8 and the Virginia Supreme Court, in Frye v. Common-
wealth,0 9 reaffirmed that exclusion of jurors with unequivocal op-
position to the death penalty does not violate a defendant's sixth
amendment right to a representative and impartial jury.
The Virginia Court of Appeals recognized that there is "no abso-
lute constitutional right" to withdraw a waiver of a jury trial, but
the withdrawal is normally permitted upon a showing that it will
not "unduly delay the trial or . ..otherwise impede justice." 10
The court also reversed a contempt citation for delaying the re-
quest for a jury until the day of trial. Contempt is not appropriate
unless the delayed request was willfully made for the purpose of
obstructing or interrupting the administration of justice."'
E. Trial
The Virginia Court of Appeals recently interpreted the statutory
provisions and due process considerations applicable to speedy tri-
als. When a grand jury fails to return a true bill, the defendant is
entitled to be discharged from custody. If the defendant is held in
custody on an unrelated criminal conviction, such custody does not
107. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
108. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986).
109. 231 Va. -, 345 S.E.2d 267 (1986).
110. Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392, 399, 345 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1986).
111. Id.
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violate due process nor does it trigger the statutory time periods
applicable to speedy trials.112 The Virginia Court of Appeals also
held that speedy trial considerations do not apply to probation
revocation hearings.113
Massey v. Commonwealth"4 recognized that where a witness's
testimony is merely cumulative, its introduction may be limited by
the trial court. However, a witness's testimony cannot be excluded
merely because it is corroborative in nature. The court defined cu-
mulative testimony as "repetitive testimony that restates what has
been said already and adds nothing to it." 1 5 Corroborative evi-
dence was defined as that which "does not emanate from the de-
fendant's mouth, does not rest wholly upon the defendant's credi-
bility, but is evidence that adds to, strengthens, and confirms
defendant's testimony. '' 16
When the commonwealth offers a witness for the purpose of
proving that he has no recollection of the incident, the defendant
has an absolute right to cross-examine the witness respecting his
memory and all other relevant matters." The privilege of an ac-
cused to prevent his spouse from testifying terminates upon proof
of a final divorce; however, the interspousal confidential communi-
cation privilege survives the dissolution of marriage.1 The Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals recognized that defense witnesses may tes-
tify to the defendant's reputation within the work community or
any area where the defendant is well known.1 9 The appropriate
"community" is not limited to the geographic area where the de-
fendant resides. 20 The court also noted that the defendant's repu-
tation may be established by negative inferences, e.g., where the
witness has not heard any negative comments on the defendant's
good character.' 2'
The United States Supreme Court limited the authority of the
federal courts to subpoena state prisoners. Absent exceptional cir-
cumstances, a federal district court lacks authority to order mar-
112. Presley v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 348, 344 S.E.2d 195 (1986).
113. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 329, 343 S.E.2d 385 (1986).
114. 230 Va. 436, 337 S.E.2d 754 (1985).
115. Id. at 442, 337 S.E.2d at 758.
116. Id. at 443, 337 S.E.2d at 758.
117. Barnett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 108, 341 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1986).
118. Church v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 208, 214-15, 335 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1985).
119. Byrdsong v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 400, 345 S.E.2d 528 (1986).
120. Id. at 403, 345 S.E.2d at 530.
121. Id. at 408, 345 S.E.2d at 532.
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shals to transport state prisoners to the federal courthouse to tes-
tify in a section 1983 action brought by a state prisoner.122 The
Court also recognized that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees
an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examina-
tion that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the
defense might wish. ' 123 An improper denial of a defendant's oppor-
tunity to impeach a witness for bias is subject to harmless-error
analysis. 24 The confrontation clause does not require that a co-
conspirator be unavailable to testify at trial, so long as there are
sufficient indicia of reliability.125 However, Lee v. Illinois 26 recog-
nized that a co-defendant's confession inculpating the accused is
inherently unreliable. To overcome the weighty presumption
against the admission of such uncrossed-examined evidence, there
must exist "sufficient 'indicia of reliability,' flowing from either the
circumstances surrounding the confession or the 'interlocking'
character of the confessions.' 1 27
Hopkins v. Commonwealth 28 recognized that the admissibility
of the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness is within the
discretion of the trial court. The trial judge must determine
whether the hypnosis affected the witness's capacity to observe, re-
member, and communicate facts so as to render the witness incom-
petent. Hopkins also held that only statements of fact contained
within reports of the chief medical examiner are admissible under
a statutory exception to the hearsay rule.129 Expressions of opinion
are not admissible, merely because they are included within such
reports. The Virginia Court of Appeals held that photographs
which are properly authenticated by testimony are admissible even
when the requirements of the statute are not satisfied. 30 The court
also approved the use of a toy doll for demonstrative purposes,. 31
and recognized that the competency of a juvenile witness is to be
determined on the same basis as all other witnesses: capacity to
observe events, capacity to recollect and communicate them, and
ability to understand questions and to frame and make intelligent
122. Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections v. United States Marshals, 106 S. Ct. 355 (1985).
123. Delaware v. Fensterer, 106 S. Ct. 292, 295 (1985).
124. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (1986).
125. United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1129 (1986).
126. 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2065 (1986).
127. Id.
128. 230 Va. 280, 337 S.E.2d 264 (1985).
129. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-188 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
130. Saunders v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 396, 339 S.E.2d 550 (1986).
131. Kehinde v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 342, 338 S.E.2d 356 (1986).
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answers, with a consciousness of the duty to speak the truth.132
The Virginia Supreme Court continued to discourage any use of
lie detectors at trial. Robinson v. Commonwealth133 refused to per-
mit the results of a polygraph test to be used for impeachment
purposes. The Virginia Court of Appeals reaffirmed that an ade-
quate chain of custody is established when there is "reasonable"
assurance that exhibits at trial are the same and in the same con-
dition as they were when first obtained."'
In the troublesome area of a defendant's "other criminal of-
fenses," the Virginia Supreme Court issued a general caution that
relevant evidence must be weighed against the tendency of the evi-
dence to produce passion and prejudice out of proportion to its
probative value.135 The Virginia Court of Appeals offered specific
guidance by listing eight circumstances where evidence of "other
crimes" may be relevant: (1) to prove motive to commit the crime
charged; (2) to establish guilty knowledge or to negate good faith;
(3) to negate the possibility of mistake or accident; (4) to show the
conduct and feeling of the accused toward his victim, or to estab-
lish their prior relations; (5) to prove opportunity; (6) to prove
identity of the accused as the one who committed the crime where
the prior criminal acts are so distinctive as to indicate a modus
operandi; (7) to demonstrate a common scheme or plan where the
other crime or crimes constitute a part of a general scheme of
which the crime charged is a part; and (8) when evidence of other
crimes is so intimately connected and blended with facts proving
the commission of the offense charged that it cannot be separated
with propriety.13 6
In Pancoast v. Commonwealth,13 7 the Virginia Court of Appeals
offered Virginia's first definitive look at the defense of duress.
"The common law defense of duress excuses acts which would oth-
erwise constitute a crime, where the defendant shows that the acts
were the product of threats inducing a reasonable fear of immedi-
ate death or serious bodily harm."138 Where it is properly shown,
duress is a complete defense to a crime. However, if the defendant
132. Royal v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 59, 341 S.E.2d 660 (1986).
133. 231 Va. 142, 341 S.E.2d 159 (1986).
134. Horsley v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 335, 343 S.E.2d 389 (1986).
135. Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 340 S.E.2d 820 (1986).
136. Stuphini v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 241, 337 S.E.2d 897 (1985).
137. 2 Va. App. 28, 340 S.E.2d 833 (1986).
138. Id. at 33, 340 S.E.2d at 835 (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980)).
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failed to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to escape, or
of a reasonable opportunity to avoid doing the acts without being
harmed, the defendant may not rely on duress as a defense. Vague
threats of future harm will not suffice to excuse criminal conduct.
When the defendant fails to take advantage of an alternative to
criminal conduct, the defendant may not rely on the defense of
duress."8 9
The Virginia Court of Appeals also reaffirmed that counsel's
opening statements are not evidence, thus preventing counsel from
placing his client's character into evidence through his opening re-
marks. 140 Darden v. Wainwright'14' presented an extreme example
of prosecution's emotional appeals during closing argument. In
Darden, the prosecutor stated: "I wish I could see (the defendant)
sitting here with no face, blown away by a shotgun."'' Although
such argument was condemned by every court to review it, the
United States Supreme Court found that such comments had not
"so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting con-
viction a denial of due process.' 143 Although not a constitutional
violation, it is doubtful that Virginia courts would permit such im-
proper emotional pleas. 144
There is a helpful discussion of the irresistible impulse test in
the majority and dissenting opinions in Godley v. Common-
wealth.45 The 1986 General Assembly changed a number of the
procedures applicable to raising the insanity defense. The defend-
ant must give twenty-one days notice of his intention to present
expert testimony of an insanity defense.' 46 The court may then or-
der the defendant to submit to an evaluation by commonwealth
experts, and shall advise the defendant on the record that a refusal
to cooperate could result in exclusion of the defendant's expert evi-
dence.147 If the defendant refuses to cooperate, the court may ad-
mit evidence of such refusal or, in the discretion of the court, bar
the defendant from presenting expert testimony on the issue of in-
139. Id.
140. Fields v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 300, 343 S.E.2d 379 (1986).
141. 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1985).
142. Id. at 2472 n.12.
143. Id. at 2472.
144. See Dingus v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 846, 149 S.E. 414 (1929).
145. 2 Va. App. 249, 343 S.E.2d 368 (1986).
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-168 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
147. Id. § 19.2-168.1.
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sanity.1 4 The legislation also addresses the defendant's right to ex-
pert testimony149 in capital offense cases.
150
Having previously recognized a first amendment right of access
to suppression hearings, 15 and voir dire, 152 the United States Su-
preme Court extended the right of access to preliminary hear-
ings. 1 3 Closure is appropriate only upon specific findings that: (1)
there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a
fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would pre-
vent; and (2) reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately
protect the defendant's free trial rights.'"
F. Sentencing
A condition for imposing the death penalty is a factual finding
that the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a kill-
ing take place.1 55 However, under federal constitutional law, this
finding need not be made either by the jury or the sentencing
judge, but may instead be made by a reviewing court.5 6 Double
jeopardy does not bar a further capital sentencing proceeding when
a reviewing court finds the evidence insufficient to support the
only aggravating factor on which the sentencing judge relied, and
insufficient also to support the death penalty.1 57
Of more immediate impact in Virginia is the United States Su-
preme Court's ruling that a sentencer may not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's
character or record, and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.158 The court also held that the presumption of judicial vin-
dictiveness 159 upon resentencing does not apply to cases in which
the trial judge granted a post-trial motion for a new trial based on
148. Id. § 19.2-168.1 (B).
149. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
151. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 281 S.E.2d 915 (1981).
152. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
153. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986).
154. Id. at 2743.
155. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
156. Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689 (1986).
157. Poland v. Arizona, 106 S. Ct. 1749 (1986).
158. Skipper v. South Carolina, 106 S. Ct. 1669 (1986).
159. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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prosecutorial misconduct.160 New evidence regarding the defend-
ant's past "life, conduct, and his mental and moral propensities"
may justify an increased sentence upon retrial.'6 '
Also with respect to the death penalty, the United States Su-
preme Court reaffirmed the common-law rule prohibiting a state
from inflicting the death penalty upon an insane person. 6 2 The
Court also addressed the type of due process hearing required to
determine post-conviction insanity. While not mandating a partic-
ular procedure, the Court found three due process deficiencies in
the Florida procedure: (1) the defendant was not a party to the
proceeding; (2) the defendant was denied any opportunity to chal-
lenge the determination of sanity; and (3) the decision of sanity
was placed wholly within the executive branch.16 3
in Duncan v. Commonwealth,6 the Virginia Court of Appeals
limited defense efforts to present mitigating circumstances to the
jury. The defendant offered evidence that he had made restitution,
and had continued to be employed by the victim of the felony. The
trial court's decision to exclude such evidence was upheld by the
court of appeals. "By vesting the trial court with discretionary au-
thority to suspend or modify the sentence imposed by the jury, the
legislature intended to leave the consideration of mitigating cir-
cumstances to the court."'6 5
Although the due process clause requires the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense
charged, 6 ' the preponderance of evidence standard may be used to
determine aggravating factors which affect the sentence to be im-
posed.167 Under appropriate circumstances, defense counsel's deci-
sion not to introduce any evidence (other than a plea for mercy) in
mitigation of the death penalty is reasonable and not ineffective
representation of counsel. 8'
160. Texas v. McCullough, 106 S. Ct. 976 (1986).
161. Id. at 982.
162. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
163. Id. at 2604-05.
164. 2 Va. App. 342, 343 S.E.2d 392 (1986).
165. Id. at 345, 343 S.E.2d at 394.
166. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
167. McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986).
168. Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 21 (1986).
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G. Appeals
Failure to file notice of appeal with the trial court is jurisdic-
tional, and the Virginia Court of Appeals has no authority to ex-
tend the time period.16 9 However, the court may extend the time
for delivering a copy of the notice of appeal to the clerk of the
court of appeals. 7 0 Commonwealth v. Smith1 71 recognized that the
commonwealth may appeal a judgment of the court of appeals ad-
mitting a convicted defendant to bail. Because the issue was not
properly presented, the Virginia Supreme Court declined to rule
on whether a single judge of the court of appeals has authority to
grant or deny bail.172
Absent a specific showing of bias or prejudice, the trial judge
may preside over a habeas corpus proceeding.' 3 The court of ap-
peals may not issue a writ for one held under criminal process, be-
cause only the Virginia Supreme Court or the circuit court which
entered the original judgment may issue a writ of habeas corpus in
such cases. 17 4 The court of appeals also is without jurisdiction to
hear habeas corpus appeals arising from convictions where the
death penalty has been imposed.17 5 Welch v. Department of Cor-
rections1 16 recognized that the scope of a habeas corpus inquiry is
limited to determining the propriety of the present detention.
There is no requirement that the petitioner be given credit for
time served under a void sentence prior to the habeas corpus
proceeding.
In its review of two Virginia cases, the United States Supreme
Court further tightened the procedural bars to federal habeas
corpus review. Some twenty years ago, the "Warren Court" held
that the failure to exhaust state remedies of direct appeal and
state habeas corpus would bar federal habeas corpus review only if
the habeas petitioner had "deliberately by-passed the orderly pro-
cedure of the state courts. 1 77 This deliberate by-pass required "an
169. Williams v. Landon, 1 Va. App. 206, 336 S.E.2d 907 (1985).
170. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 510, 339 S.E.2d 919 (1986).
171. 230 Va. 354, 337 S.E.2d 278 (1985).
172. Id. at 361, 337 S.E.2d at 282.
173. Titcomb v. Wyant, 1 Va. App. 31, 333 S.E.2d 82 (1985).
174. Bullock v. Department of Corrections, 1 Va. App. 70, 334 S.E.2d 150, cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 576 (1985).
175. Peterson v. Bass, 2 Va. App. 314, 343 S.E.2d 475 (1986).
176. 1 Va. App. 179, 334 S.E.2d 150 (1985).
177. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
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intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."' 78 Wainwright v. Sykes' 7 9 implied that default of a
claim by counsel pursuant to trial strategy would bind the habeas
petitioner even if he had not personally waived that claim. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted Wainwright as
requiring a deliberate decision of counsel, and thus permitted fed-
eral habeas corpus review when counsel's failure to pursue state
remedies was due to ignorance or inadvertance 80 The Supreme
Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that "so long as a de-
fendant is represented by counsel whose performance is not consti-
tutionally ineffective. . . we discern no inequity in requiring him
to bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural de-
fault."'' The only exception is that, in an "extraordinary case
where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the con-
viction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may
grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the
procedural default.' i8 2
Finally, in Rose v. Clark,'s3 the United States Supreme Court
held that harmless error analysis184 must be applied to cases where
a jury instruction has impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to
a defendant. 8 '
178. Id. at 439.
179. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
180. Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1983).
181. Smith v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 2661 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645-46
(1986).
182. Murray, 106 S. Ct. at 2650.
183. 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986).
184. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
185. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
[Vol. 20:789810
